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This paper empirically assesses the relation between bank performance and capital 
regulation for Islamic banks from 13 countries and evaluates whether the relation 
varies with bank size, capital, and liquidity. We find small Islamic banks to be less 
stable and less profitable; they also cut lending growth as capital regulation becomes 
more stringent. The stability and lending growth of big Islamic banks are, however, 
directly related to capital regulation. Further, capital regulation adversely affects the 
profitability of Islamic banks with low liquidity and high capital holdings. While 
capital regulation is needed, it should not be adopted in a blanket manner for all 
Islamic banks.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The rapid growth of Islamic banking in both size and complexity poses a key 
challenge in ensuring financial soundness in countries with both conventional and 
Islamic banks (IMF, 2017). While there are gaps and differences in Islamic banking 
regulatory frameworks across countries, Islamic banking is normally subject to the 
same banking regulations or regulatory environments as faced by conventional 
banks in their respective countries, particularly with respect to capital regulation 
and capital stringency requirements. Unfortunately, to date, there is a dearth of 
guidance in the literature on the effects of the stringency of capital requirements 
on Islamic bank performance. Moreover, existing findings for conventional banks 
may not be generalized to Islamic banks, due to their different business model. 
This begs the following questions: Is capital regulation of conventional banks 
applicable to Islamic banks? Is capital regulation effective in ensuring Islamic 
banking stability? Would capital regulation erode Islamic banking profitability or 
lending activity? And most importantly, does capital regulation fit Islamic banks 
with different bank-specific characteristics?
In light of these questions, the present paper assesses the relation between 
capital stringency regulation and Islamic banking performance. While we focus 
exclusively on capital stringency regulation, which aligns most closely to Basel 
capital standards, we contribute to the literature on the subject on various fronts. 
First, this paper provides a more comprehensive look at the issue for Islamic 
banks. While existing Islamic banking literature on the subject focuses mainly on 
only one aspect of performance, bank risk, we evaluate the implications of capital 
regulation on bank risk or stability, bank profitability, and lending behavior. 
Second, we address the question as to whether capital regulation fits Islamic 
banks with varying bank-specific characteristics. More specifically, we consider 
bank size, capital, and liquidity as potential factors that condition the relation 
between capital regulation and bank performance. And finally, we employ a 
panel sample of established Islamic banks across 13 dual-banking countries over 
a longer time-span than most existing Islamic banking studies, which allows us to 
leverage variations in capital regulation not only across countries but also across 
time. Principally, we contribute not only to the expanding literature on capital 
regulation and bank performance by focusing on the nascent but fast-growing 
Islamic banking sector, but also to enriching understanding and analysis of the 
Islamic banking sector.
Our results suggest that capital regulation does not affect all Islamic banks 
equally. Small Islamic banks seem to be more adversely affected; that is, they 
become less stable and less profitable and cut lending growth as capital regulation 
becomes more stringent. By contrast, the stability and lending growth of large 
Islamic banks are positively associated with capital regulation. We also find evidence 
indicating that the profitability of Islamic banks with low liquidity is adversely 
affected by capital regulation. Interestingly, capital regulation negatively affects 
the profitability of highly capitalized Islamic banks, while it has no implications for 
their stability and lending growth. These results hint at the importance of capital 
regulation for Islamic banks given that they have increased in size and complexity 
over the years. Still, capital regulation should not be adopted as a blanket rule 
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applicable to all Islamic banks, especially in those countries where Islamic banks 
are small or in their infancy.
This paper unfolds as follows. Section II reviews the related literature. Section 
III details the variables and empirical models. Section IV presents estimation 
results and, finally, Section V sets forth conclusions.
II. RELATED LITERATURE
Capital regulation, which normally equates to capital requirements, and its relation 
to bank performance has been a subject of intense discussion, especially since the 
Global Financial Crisis. While capital regulation is intended to curb excessive risk-
taking and ensure bank stability, there have been concerns over its undesirable 
effects. Indeed, the literature highlights both positive and negative effects of capital 
regulation, see Triki et al. (2017), Deli and Hasan (2017), Bermpei et al. (2018) and 
references therein. On the positive side, by encouraging capital holdings in excess 
of minimum capital requirements, capital regulation reduces the moral hazard 
problem, enhances loss absorption capacity, and improves monitoring and control 
of risk by shareholders. As a result, banks become more stable and profitable 
and have greater ability to enhance credit growth. On the negative side, capital 
regulation may lead to reduced lending as a result of downward adjustments 
of risk-weighted assets to meet capital requirements. Moreover, it may weaken 
monitoring by lenders. Together with the fact that holding more capital than 
necessary is costly, banks may undertake more risk.
Existing empirical studies remain inconclusive as to the nature of the relation 
between capital regulation and bank performance. For instance, Agoraki et al. 
(2011) and Tan and Floros (2013) provide supporting evidence for a risk-mitigating 
effect of capital regulation. Likewise, Boudrigua et al. (2009) document a reduction 
in non-performing loans under more stringent capital requirements. Such 
requirements also lead banks to perform better and to be more efficient (Naceur 
and Kandil, 2009). By contrast, Osei-Assibey and Asenso (2015) provide support 
for an increase in non-performing loans under stringent capital regulation. In 
addition, De Nicolo (2015) finds a relatively large adverse effect of capital ratios 
on bank loans.
Some studies explore the possibility that documented variations in the relation 
between capital regulation and bank performance are shaped by such factors as 
bank-specific characteristics (Agoraki et al., 2011, Deli and Hasan, 2017, and Triki 
et al., 2017) and institutional quality (Fratzscher et al., 2016; Bermpei et al., 2018). 
Agoraki et al. (2011) evaluate whether bank market power shapes the effects of 
regulation on bank risk using a sample of 546 banks in 13 Central and Eastern 
European countries. The results suggest that the risk reduction effect of capital 
regulation is weakened or even reversed by market power. Deli and Hasan (2017) 
examine whether bank capital and liquidity affect the relation between capital 
regulation and loan growth using a worldwide sample from 125 countries. These 
authors document evidence indicating a negative effect of capital stringency 
on loan growth only for very low capitalized banks. However, over the longer 
term, there appear to be no permanent loan growth effects from more stringent 
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capital regulation. Interestingly, they also document variations in the effects of 
different aspects of capital regulation. Focusing on 42 African countries, Triki et 
al. (2017) show that the efficiency gains from more stringent capital requirements 
materialize only for large banks and low risk banks. Using aggregate data from 50 
advanced and emerging market economies, Fratzscher et al. (2016) document the 
substitute role of institutional quality for capital regulation in that the decline in 
credit growth and bank stability during the Global Financial Crisis is countered by 
greater supervisory independence; this counteracting effect is strongest in countries 
with poor institutions. Finally, evaluating the banking sectors of 69 emerging and 
developing economies, Bermpei et al. (2018) identify various aspects of institutions 
that condition the effects of bank regulation on stability. These include control of 
corruption, political stability, creditor rights, and rule of law.
Within the nascent and fast-growing Islamic banking sector, there is a clear 
concern over the impacts of capital regulation. This stems from the fact that capital 
regulations as per Basel requirements are designed for conventional banks but, 
once adopted by a country, they apply to Islamic banks as well (Zins and Weill, 
2017). Unfortunately, the findings from existing studies may not be generalized 
to Islamic banks, given that Islamic banks differ from conventional banks in their 
adherence to Shariah or Islamic law.
While some studies consider bank capital either as a focal variable or a control 
variable in explaining Islamic bank performance, studies that focus directly on 
the effects of capital regulation on Islamic banks are rather scarce. Among the few 
recent studies in the literature, Alam (2014), Zins and Weill (2017), and Ibrahim and 
Rizvi (2017) are notable. Employing a panel sample of 70 Islamic banks and 165 
conventional banks from 11 dual-banking countries, Alam (2014) focuses on the 
role of various banking regulations, including capital regulation, in shaping bank 
risk as measured by the ratio of loan loss reserves to total assets. These authors 
document evidence for the ability of capital requirements and private monitoring to 
mitigate risk-taking of both types of banks. Meanwhile, activity restrictions induce 
conventional banks to take more risk and Islamic banks to be more conservative. 
Zins and Weill (2017) generate evidence that Basel II is disadvantageous to Islamic 
banks because it widens the gap in risk between Islamic banks and conventional 
banks. Ibrahim and Rizvi (2017) focus principally on size–stability relations and, as 
an additional analysis, examine whether banking regulations impact Islamic banks 
of varying sizes differently. These authors document evidence suggesting more 
favorable effects on bank stability of regulation in the form of capital stringency 
and activity restrictions as bank size increases. The converse, however, holds for 
private monitoring and supervisory power.
The present study adds to this line of research. We follow the recent trend 
in the literature by focusing on bank-specific factors that likely condition the 
relation between capital regulation and Islamic bank performance, in addition to 
evaluating various dimensions of bank performance.
Capital Regulation and Islamic Banking Performance: Panel Evidence 51
III. VARIABLES AND MODELS
This section first explains the variables, then presents the empirical models used to 
address the research objectives, i.e., (i) to examine the impacts of capital regulation 
on Islamic banking stability, profitability, and lending growth, and (ii) to assess 
whether these impacts vary with bank size, capital, and liquidity.
A. Variables
The variables representing bank performance, which form the set of dependent 
variables, are bank stability, bank profitability, and bank lending growth. We use 
Z-score, computed as the sum of return on assets and equity-to-asset ratio divided 
by the standard deviation of asset return over a three-year rolling window, to 
represent bank stability. The Z-score is widely used in the literature. It captures the 
distance from insolvency, i.e., the number of standard deviations that asset return 
must fall to deplete capital. Following Cubillas and Gonzalez (2014), Anginer et 
al. (2014) and others, we express Z-score in the natural logarithmic form (LnZ). 
As for bank profitability, we use return on average assets (ROA), which measures 
the ability of a bank to generate return from its assets, and is viewed as a common 
and direct measure of bank profitability (Athanasoglou et al., 2008; Garcia-Herrero 
et al., 2009; Tan, 2016). Finally, bank lending growth is represented by the annual 
growth rate of gross loans (ΔLOAN). These three bank performance measures 
are common subjects of inquiry as to whether they are impacted by capital 
requirements (Agoraki et al., 2011; Naceur and Omran, 2011; Delis et al., 2012; Deli 
and Hasan, 2017; Triki et al., 2017; Bermpei et al., 2018).
The key explanatory variable is the capital regulation index (CR) compiled by 
Barth et al. (2006, 2013). This index is based on various questions related to capital 
requirements from World Bank surveys, including whether the capital asset ratio 
is in line with Basel guidelines; whether it varies with market risk and unrealized 
loan losses; whether losses in securities portfolios and in foreign exchange are 
deducted from book value before minimum capital adequacy is determined; 
whether sources of funds used as capital are verified by regulatory/supervisory 
authorities; whether initial or subsequent injections of capital can be made using 
assets other than cash and government securities; and whether initial disbursement 
of capital can be made with borrowed funds. The surveys were published in 1998, 
2002, 2006 and 2011 (Fratzscher et al., 2016). We follow Bermpei et al. (2018) in 
assigning values from the surveys to create the yearly capital regulation index. 
That is, the index from the 1998 survey is assigned to the 2000–2001 period, the 
2002 survey index is assigned to the 2002–2005 period, the 2006 survey index is 
assigned to the 2006–2010 period, and the 2011 survey index is assigned to the 
2011–2014 period. The index varies from 0 to 10, with higher values indicating 
greater capital stringency.
We also include as explanatory variables several bank-specific and 
macroeconomic variables normally considered in studies evaluating bank 
performance. There is heated discussion, especially since the Global Financial Crisis, 
on the “too big to fail” thesis vis-à-vis “economies of scale” advantages of large 
banks (Beccalli et al., 2015; Moutsianas and Kosmidou, 2016). Hence, we include 
bank size in the analysis. Following Cihak and Hesse (2010), Doumpos et al. (2015) 
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and Triki at el. (2017), we measure bank size using the natural log of total assets 
(LnTA). In addition, it is widely viewed that bank capital and liquidity can absorb 
shocks, making banks more stable as a result, although both capital and liquidity 
tend to be more costly and yield lower returns. We use the equity-to-asset ratio 
(EQA) and liquid assets–to–total assets ratio (LIQA) to measure, respectively, 
bank capital and liquidity. These three bank-specific variables are almost always 
considered, especially in explaining bank loan supply or bank lending channels 
of monetary transmission mechanisms. In our case, we examine whether the 
impact of capital regulation on bank performance varies with these bank-specific 
characteristics, in line with the bank lending channel literature. Apart from these 
key bank-specific variables, we also include cost inefficiency as measured by the 
cost-to-income ratio (CIR); see, for instance, Delis et al. (2012) and Zins and Weill 
(2017). Finally, following Bermpei et al. (2018) and others, we include real GDP 
growth (ΔY) and inflation (INF) to capture macroeconomic cycles and uncertainty, 
which would likely affect bank performance.
Data on bank-specific variables are sourced from Fitch Connect. The 
macroeconomic variables and capital regulation are from the World Development 
Indicators database and Barth et al. (2006, 2013).
B. Empirical Models
To assess the relation between capital regulation and Islamic bank performance, 
we begin with the following basic model:
   
   (1)
PF is a measure of Islamic bank performance, namely, bank stability (LnZ), bank 
profitability (ROA), or bank lending growth (ΔLOAN). We include the lagged 
performance measure to allow for its persistence. CR is capital regulation. BS is a 
vector of bank-specific variables. The common bank-specific variables across the 
three performance measures are bank size (LnTA), capital (EQA), liquidity (LIQA), 
and cost inefficiency (CIR). In addition, we include profitability and loan growth 
in the bank stability equation if they are significant. Similar treatment is applied 
to the profitability and lending growth equations. Note that these bank-specific 
variables are lagged by 1 to address the endogeneity concern. MAC is a vector of 
macroeconomic variables, which includes real GDP growth (ΔY) and inflation rate 
(INF). mi is individual fixed effects, and vit is the standard disturbance term.
The key coefficient in (1) is b1, which measures the relation between bank 
performance and capital regulation. While capital regulation aims to ensure 
bank stability, there is concern that it may place undue constraints on banks or 
have undesirable effects on bank performance. Moreover, capital regulation may 
not fit all banks equally. Accordingly, to address whether the impacts of capital 
regulation vary with bank-specific characteristics, we extend the model to include 
an interaction term as follows:
 
    (2)
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where bs is one of the bank-specific variables, i.e., bank size, capitalization, and 
liquidity. By including the interaction term as in (2), the marginal effects of capital 
regulation on bank performance depend on bs. That is:
        (3)
Thus, for concreteness, we compute and graph these marginal effects across bs 
values as suggested by Brambor et al. (2006).
There are small variations in model specification across the three bank 
performance equations, and hence their estimation strategies. In particular, we 
drop the lagged dependent variable in the lending growth equation, since it turns 
out to be insignificant, and estimate it using the random-effects panel estimator. 
As for the other two equations, given lagged dependent variables in the equations, 
we adopt the two-step system GMM estimator for the dynamic panel models 
as suggested by Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998), and 
employ the Windmeijer (2005) correction for downward bias in standard errors. 
We perform the standard Arellano-Bond test for autocorrelation and the Hansen 
test for instrument validity to ensure consistency of our estimates. We indicate 
other variations in model specification in the results section below.
IV. ESTIMATION RESULTS
Our analysis focuses exclusively on Islamic banking and its relation to capital 
regulation. We gather bank-level data on Islamic banks from the following 13 
dual-banking countries: Bahrain, Bangladesh, Egypt, Indonesia, Jordan, Kuwait, 
Malaysia, Pakistan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, Turkey, and the United Arab 
Emirates. The panel data are unbalanced, covering the period 2000 to 2014. 
This table reports the means of the variables by country. Z-score = the Z-score computed as the ratio of return on assets 
plus equity to asset ratio to the standard deviation of the return on assets, ROA = returns on average assets, ∆LOAN = 
the loan growth rate, TA = total assets (in USD billion) , EQA = equity-to-assets ratio, LIQA = liquid assets to total assets 
ratio, CIR = cost to income ratio, ∆Y = the real GDP growth rate, INF = inflation, and CR = capital regulation index. 
Z-score ROA ΔLOAN CR TA EQA LIQA CIR ΔY INF
Bahrain 88.21 1.90 15.17 5.39 3,271.07 20.88 18.15 58.69 5.14 2.14
Bangladesh 33.06 1.13 24.73 4.57 1,297.93 6.85 19.34 45.90 5.80 6.76
Egypt 54.14 -0.30 0.69 3.07 2,657.71 5.44 19.02 71.54 4.14 8.52
Indonesia 37.16 1.19 29.12 4.00 2,240.94 11.72 20.11 65.44 5.45 7.18
Jordan 42.01 1.35 12.98 5.53 1,357.05 19.11 30.68 57.28 5.24 3.98
Kuwait 48.29 1.55 9.42 5.11 11,215.69 14.88 24.02 60.39 5.01 1.93
Malaysia 82.04 0.76 17.12 4.94 7,680.70 8.15 26.31 50.94 5.06 2.46
Pakistan 48.79 1.72 28.46 7.23 1,531.11 9.50 21.76 55.26 4.28 10.23
Qatar 70.08 3.47 18.94 4.60 6,550.75 16.34 23.90 28.95 11.55 4.21
Saudi Arabia 38.44 2.65 16.65 5.10 18,970.56 15.94 23.35 50.37 5.28 3.22
Tunisia 124.71 1.70 11.30 4.71 393.76 21.72 39.51 48.13 3.72 7.34
Turkey 43.21 1.54 22.89 4.00 5,194.89 10.78 20.10 73.53 4.17 13.56
UAE 109.37 2.32 21.4 5.41 8,805.11 18.10 19.95 43.76 4.54 4.70
Table 1.
Variable Means by Country
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We include only Islamic banks that have data available from 2005 or earlier, such 
that they cover at least two regulatory surveys by the World Bank. Given that the 
latest survey is from 2011, we view it reasonable to end our sample at 2014. With 
these considerations, we arrive at the final panel sample of 45 Islamic banks.
This table reports the descriptive statistics of the variables, namely their means and standard deviations and their 
pairwise correlation coefficients. Z-score = the Z-score computed as the ratio of return on assets plus equity to asset 
ratio to the standard deviation of the return on assets, ROA = returns on average assets, ∆LOAN = the loan growth rate, 
TA = total assets (in USD billion) , EQA = equity-to-assets ratio, LIQA = liquid assets to total assets ratio, CIR = cost to 
income ratio, ∆Y = the real GDP growth rate, INF = inflation, and CR = capital regulation index. 
Descriptive Stat Correlation Coefficients
Mean S.D. Z-score ROA ∆LOAN TA EQA LIQA CIR ∆Y INF CR
Z-Score 62.359 122.65  1.00
ROA 1.571 2.788  0.01  1.00
∆LOAN 0.174 0.266 -0.07  0.21  1.00
TA 5,757.20 9,759.98  0.12  0.11 -0.06  1.00
EQA 13.705 9.316  0.03  0.42 -0.01 -0.03  1.00
LIQA 22.198 12.771  0.01  0.00 -0.07 -0.15  0.01  1.00
CIR 54.756 51.352 -0.06 -0.53 -0.00 -0.12 -0.02  0.03 1.00
∆Y 5.269 3..300 -0.01  0.31  0.15 -0.07  0.12  0.13 -0.10 1.00
INF 5.364 6.097 -0.09  0.02  0.08 -0.15 -0.19  0.01 -0.01  0.04 1.00
CR 4.844 1.884  0.19 -0.12 -0.13  0.16  0.04 -0.13 0.01 -0.26 -0.26 1.00
Table 2.
Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Coefficients
Table 1 shows the means of the variables by country while Table 2 presents 
descriptive statistics and their pairwise correlation coefficients. Several 
observations arise from the tables. First, despite the rapid growth of the Islamic 
banking sector in these countries, there are marked variations in the performance 
of Islamic banks across the 13 countries. We find Islamic banks in Tunisia to be most 
stable and those in Bangladesh to be least stable, as indicated by the Z-score. In 
terms of profitability, Islamic banks in Qatar are ranked first, followed by banks in 
Saudi Arabia and UAE. Egyptian Islamic banks, however, record negative average 
profit over the sample period. They also have the lowest credit growth. In all 
countries, except Egypt and Kuwait, average annual growth of Islamic financing 
is in the double digits. Second, we observe differences in capital regulation, bank-
specific characteristics and macroeconomic environments. Thus, these factors may 
potentially explain Islamic bank performance in these countries. Our focus here 
is on the role of capital regulation. Finally, we may infer from the low correlation 
coefficients for all pairs of explanatory variables that the multicollinearity problem 
should not be a major concern.
The estimation results are presented in Tables 3 to 5 for, respectively, bank 
stability, profitability, and lending growth. To ease interpretation and inferences 
on our key themes, we present the marginal effects of bank regulation on bank 
performance together with the 90% confidence interval for the three cases in 
Figures 1 to 3. Below, we discuss each case.
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A. Capital Regulation and Bank Stability
Table 3 reports regression results for the bank stability equation, while Figure 1 
shows the marginal effects of capital regulation on bank stability. We find that 
using the first lag of the dependent variable is not sufficient to render the error 
terms uncorrelated. Accordingly, we extend the lagged dependent variable up to 
lag 2. Both the Hansen test statistics and the Arellano-Bond autocorrelation test 
statistics confirm the validity of the instruments and absence of autocorrelation in 
all regressions. Note that, in explaining Islamic bank stability, we find profitability 
to be significant and lending growth to be insignificant. Accordingly, we also 
include lagged-1 ROA alongside other bank-specific variables.
This table reports the regression results for bank stability equation. The numbers in parentheses are p-values. LnZ = the natural log 
of the Z-score, ROA = returns on average assets, ∆LOAN = the loan growth rate, LnTA = the natural log of total assets, EQA = equity-
to-assets ratio, LIQA = liquid assets to total assets ratio, CIR = cost to income ratio, ∆Y = the real GDP growth rate, INF = inflation, 
and CR = capital regulation index. Column (1) estimates the model with no interaction terms as stated in equation (1). Meanwhile, 
columns (2)-(4) adds the interaction term, i.e. equation (2), where capital regulation is interacted alternatively with bank size, bank 
capital and bank liquidity. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
LnZt-1 0.7435*** 0.6879*** 0.7449*** 0.7440***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
LnZt-2 -0.2018*** -0.1945*** -0.2092*** -0.2047***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000)
LnTAt-1 0.2419** -0.1686 0.2409** 0.2447***
(0.012) (0.475) (0.013) (0.010)
EQAt-1 -0.0197 -0.0194 -0.0179 -0.0197
(0.131) (0.132) (0.401) (0.136)
LIQAt-1 -0.0044 -0.0035 -0.0048 0.0063
(0.557) (0.630) (0.538) (0.708)
CIRt-1 -0.0020* -0.0024** -0.0021* -0.0020*
(0.090) (0.017) (0.074) (0.084)
ROAt-1 -0.1230*** -0.1144*** -0.1208*** -0.1245***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.010) (0.008)
ΔYt 0.0647** 0.0640** 0.0652** 0.0628**
(0.019) (0.014) (0.016) (0.019)
INFt 0.0022 0.0047 0.0032 0.0018
(0.806) (0.679) (0.743) (0.836)
CRt -0.0394 -1.2681** -0.0347 -0.0015
(0.361) (0.033) (0.610) (0.981)
Table 3.
Estimation Results – Bank Stability
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This table reports the regression results for bank stability equation. The numbers in parentheses are p-values. LnZ = the natural log 
of the Z-score, ROA = returns on average assets, ∆LOAN = the loan growth rate, LnTA = the natural log of total assets, EQA = equity-
to-assets ratio, LIQA = liquid assets to total assets ratio, CIR = cost to income ratio, ∆Y = the real GDP growth rate, INF = inflation, 
and CR = capital regulation index. Column (1) estimates the model with no interaction terms as stated in equation (1). Meanwhile, 
columns (2)-(4) adds the interaction term, i.e. equation (2), where capital regulation is interacted alternatively with bank size, bank 
capital and bank liquidity. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
CRt×LnTAt-1 0.0838**
(0.045)
CRt×EQAt-1 -0.0004
(0.920)
CRt×LIQAt-1 -0.0020
(0.485)
Constant -1.4549 4.6603 -1.4305 -1.6828
(0.303) (0.187) (0.301) (0.239)
# Observations 413 413 413 413
# Banks 45 45 45 45
P(Hansen) 0.2307 0.3003 0.2133 0.2553
P(AR1) 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
P(AR2) 0.3077 0.2719 0.3365 0.2963
Table 3.
Estimation Results – Bank Stability (contd.)
Figure 1. Marginal Effects of Capital Regulation on Bank Stability
This figure plots the marginal effects of capital regulation on bank stability across bank-specific characteristics as suggested by 
Brambor et al. (2006). In the figure, the 90% confidence interval is provided together with the frequency distribution (histogram) of 
bank-specific characteristics in the background.
(a) Bank Size
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Figure 1. Marginal Effects of Capital Regulation on Bank Stability (contd.)
This figure plots the marginal effects of capital regulation on bank stability across bank-specific characteristics as suggested by 
Brambor et al. (2006). In the figure, the 90% confidence interval is provided together with the frequency distribution (histogram) of 
bank-specific characteristics in the background.
(b) Bank Capital
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(c) Bank Liquidity
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The results in column (1) of Table 3 indicate no significant effect of capital 
regulation on bank risk. However, when we include the capital regulation – bank 
size interaction, we find the coefficient of capital regulation and its interaction 
with bank size to be significant at the 5% level, with negative and positive signs, 
respectively. This means that capital regulation hurts small Islamic banks but 
helps large Islamic banks. Figure 1, panel (a), illustrates these marginal effects 
exhaustively across bank sizes. The graph clearly suggests that, for small Islamic 
banks, increasing capital regulation stringency makes them less stable. This 
negative effect of capital regulation, however, declines as banks become larger 
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and, indeed, it turns positive for the largest bank in the sample, with assets over 
$82 billion. This result is in line with Ibrahim and Rizvi (2017), which documents 
favorable effects of capital regulation for large banks. It is also in line with Triki 
et al. (2017), who find evidence suggesting efficiency gains from more stringent 
capital requirements for large banks.
When we interact capital regulation with bank capital or bank liquidity, 
neither capital regulation nor the interaction terms are significant. However, 
since the insignificance of the individual variables forming the interaction and of 
the interaction terms does not indicate the insignificance of the marginal effects 
at all levels of conditioned variables (i.e., capital and liquidity), we graph the 
corresponding marginal effects in panel (b) and panel (c) of Figure 1. Both suggest 
that the levels of bank capital and bank liquidity do not affect capital regulation – 
stability relation.
As for the control variables, larger banks tend to be more stable and, as hinted 
by the results from column 2 of Table 3, the stability effect of bank size is enhanced 
by capital regulation stringency. In other words, as Islamic banks become large, 
greater capital regulation is needed to ensure their stability. Results also indicate 
that more profitable banks are less stable. Bokpin (2016) argues that if banks have 
overriding concerns over maintaining profitability, they take more risk. In line with 
this argument, in the process of ensuring profitability, Islamic banks take more 
risk. This would increase the variance of ROA and consequently lower Z-score 
or stability. Our results also indicate that inefficient Islamic banks are less stable, 
which should be expected. Finally, Islamic bank stability is positively associated 
with economic growth.
B. Capital Regulation and Bank Profitability
Table 4 reports results for the bank profitability equation. Accompanying 
these results is Figure 2, which plots the marginal effects of bank regulation on 
profitability across bank size, capital and liquidity. In this equation, bank stability 
and lending growth enter insignificantly in all regressions, hence their exclusion. 
The Hansen test statistics and Arellano-Bond autocorrelation test statistics reported 
at the bottom of Table 4 verify the consistency of the system GMM estimates.
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This table reports the regression results for bank profitability equation. The numbers in parentheses are p-values. 
LnZ = the natural log of the Z-score, ROA = returns on average assets, ∆LOAN = the loan growth rate, LnTA = the 
natural log of total assets, EQA = equity-to-assets ratio, LIQA = liquid assets to total assets ratio, CIR = cost to income 
ratio, ∆Y = the real GDP growth rate, INF = inflation, and CR = capital regulation index. Column (1) estimates the 
model with no interaction terms as stated in equation (1). Meanwhile, columns (2)-(4) adds the interaction term, 
i.e. equation (2), where capital regulation is interacted alternatively with bank size, bank capital and bank liquidity. 
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ROAt-1 0.4416*** 0.4425*** 0.4435*** 0.4370***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
LnTAt-1 -1.7519*** -1.9715*** -1.6762*** -1.7727***
(0.005) (0.004) (0.006) (0.004)
EQAt-1 -0.1697*** -0.1685*** -0.0548 -0.1682***
(0.007) (0.008) (0.350) (0.007)
LIQAt-1 0.0036 0.0040 0.0028 -0.0128
(0.842) (0.827) (0.868) (0.583)
CIRt-1 0.0020 0.0023 0.0024 0.0019
(0.762) (0.727) (0.710) (0.764)
ΔYt 0.1739** 0.1760** 0.1741** 0.1730**
(0.026) (0.019) (0.018) (0.025)
INFt 0.0266 0.0246 0.0266 0.0271
(0.243) (0.244) (0.241) (0.223)
CRt -0.1156** -1.0065 0.2239 -0.1848
(0.048) (0.194) (0.121) (0.153)
CRt×LnTAt-1 0.0603
(0.257)
CRt×EQAt-1 -0.0251**
(0.015)
CRt×LIQAt-1 0.0034
(0.439)
Constant 28.1430*** 31.3945*** 25.4947*** 28.7389***
(0.005) (0.003) (0.006) (0.003)
# Observations 539 539 539 539
# Banks 45 45 45 45
P(Hansen) 0.3640 0.4247 0.4568 0.3778
P(AR1) 0.0651 0.0627 0.0513 0.0618
P(AR2) 0.9955 0.9980 0.9346 0.9646
Table 4.
Estimation Results – Bank Profitability
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Figure 2. Marginal Effects of Capital Regulation on Bank Profitability
This figure plots the marginal effects of capital regulation on bank profitability across bank-specific characteristics as suggested by 
Brambor et al. (2006). In the figure, the 90% confidence interval is provided together with the frequency distribution (histogram) of 
bank-specific characteristics in the background.
(a) Bank Size
| | | | | | | | | | | | | || | | | | | | | | | ||| | | | | | || | | || | | | | | | | || | || || | | ||||| | | | | | | | | | | || | | | | | | | | | | | || | | | | | | || | | | | | | | || | | | | || | | ||| | | | | || | ||||| | | | | | | | | | || | | | || | ||| | | | ||| | || | | | | |||||| | || | || | | | || | | | |||| | || | ||||| || | | | | || | | | || | | | | | || | | | | | || | | | | || | | | | | | |||| || | | | || | | | | | | | | || | | || | ||| | | | | || || |
-.7
-.6
-.5
-.4
-.3
-.2
-.1
0
.1
.2
.3
.4
.5
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18
||||||| |||| | ||||||| || ||| | || | |||||| ||| | | ||| ||| |||||| | ||| | || || |||||| | | | |||| | | ||| || | |||| |||| | | | ||||| ||| | ||| ||| || |||||| ||| || |||||| |||| ||||| | ||| || | | ||| | ||||| || ||| |||| | ||| | || | || ||||| | || |||| | ||| | ||
-3
-2.75
-2.5
-2.25
-2
-1.75
-1.5
-1.25
-1
-.75
-.5
-.25
0
.25
.5
.75
1
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70
(b) Bank Capital
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Figure 2. Marginal Effects of Capital Regulation on Bank Profitability (contd.)
This figure plots the marginal effects of capital regulation on bank profitability across bank-specific characteristics as suggested by 
Brambor et al. (2006). In the figure, the 90% confidence interval is provided together with the frequency distribution (histogram) of 
bank-specific characteristics in the background.
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In column (1), the coefficient of capital regulation (CR) is negative and 
significant at the 5% significance level. This suggests a reduction of profitability of 
0.11 percentage point as the level of capital stringency increases by 1 point. When 
we interact capital regulation with the three bank-specific variables (i.e., size, 
capital, and liquidity), the CR coefficient turns insignificant. Moreover, among 
the interaction terms, only capital regulation – capital interaction is significant 
(column 3). As noted above, in models with an interaction term, assessing the 
significance of the variables forming the interaction term must be based on the 
marginal effects as given in equation (3), and not independently on the coefficients 
of CR and the interaction terms. The marginal effects, as plotted in Figure 2, 
demonstrate that basing interpretation on the two coefficients separately would 
be misleading. The plots all indicate the role of bank size, capital, and liquidity 
in influencing the relation between capital regulation and profitability. Again, we 
note that small Islamic banks tend to be adversely affected by capital regulation. 
Moreover, low-liquidity Islamic banks suffer a drop in profitability as capital 
regulation becomes more stringent. Thus, for these small and low-liquidity 
Islamic banks, capital regulation is costly. Also, we find no significant impact of 
capital regulation on profitability of large Islamic banks. These results may be 
explained in light of the findings of Zins and Weill (2017) and our finding in 
section 4.1. Since capital requirements are disadvantageous to Islamic banks, that 
is, as Islamic banks become more risky, their profitability suffers. Large Islamic 
banks, however, are likely to be in a better position to manage risk and diversify 
their sources of income.
Interestingly, we note that profitability of highly capitalized Islamic banks is 
adversely affected by capital regulation (Figure 2, panel (b)). Perhaps holding high 
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levels of capital is suboptimal and capital stringency further imposes constraints 
on the banks; as a result, profitability drops. In other words, this result may reflect 
the costs of both capital and capital regulation.
As for the control variables, we find profitability to be negatively related to bank 
size and equity-to-asset ratio. The likely explanation for the lower profitability of 
large Islamic banks is their concentration on financing activity or limited avenues 
for income diversification. Meanwhile, capital is costly to Islamic banks as noted 
above and, accordingly, Islamic banks with high levels of capital are less profitable. 
Finally, bank profitability is directly associated with GDP growth.
C. Capital Regulation and Bank Loans
Table 5 presents the estimation results for the loan growth equation, while Figure 3 
plots the marginal effects of capital regulation on loan growth across bank sizes and 
levels of bank capital and liquidity. In conformity with Ibrahim and Rizvi (2018), 
the loan growth of Islamic banks does not exhibit persistence. That is, the lagged 
dependent variable is not significantly different from 0. Accordingly, we drop the 
lagged dependent variable from the equation. In addition, we find profitability 
to be significant, while risk is not significant. This leads us to include lagged-1 
profitability together with other bank-specific variables as control variables in the 
equation. We estimate the equation using the random-effects panel estimator such 
that generalization from the results is reasonable.
This table reports the regression results for loan growth equation. The numbers in parentheses are p-values. 
LnZ = the natural log of the Z-score, ROA = returns on average assets, ∆LOAN = the loan growth rate, LnTA = the 
natural log of total assets, EQA = equity-to-assets ratio, LIQA = liquid assets to total assets ratio, CIR = cost to income 
ratio, ∆Y = the real GDP growth rate, INF = inflation, and CR = capital regulation index. Column (1) estimates the 
model with no interaction terms as stated in equation (1). Meanwhile, columns (2)-(4) adds the interaction term, 
i.e. equation (2), where capital regulation is interacted alternatively with bank size, bank capital and bank liquidity. 
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
LnTAt-1 -0.0301** -0.0920*** -0.0296** -0.0303**
(0.017) (0.004) (0.015) (0.017)
EQAt-1 -0.0003 -0.0006 0.0034 -0.0003
(0.841) (0.656) (0.406) (0.857)
LIQAt-1 0.0043*** 0.0041*** 0.0041*** 0.0047
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.130)
CIRt-1 0.0004 0.0004 0.0004 0.0004
(0.302) (0.297) (0.321) (0.300)
ROAt-1 0.0193*** 0.0200*** 0.0191*** 0.0193***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
∆Yt 0.0072* 0.0079** 0.0069* 0.0071*
(0.078) (0.045) (0.098) (0.075)
Table 5.
Estimation Results – Bank Loan Growth
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This table reports the regression results for loan growth equation. The numbers in parentheses are p-values. 
LnZ = the natural log of the Z-score, ROA = returns on average assets, ∆LOAN = the loan growth rate, LnTA = the 
natural log of total assets, EQA = equity-to-assets ratio, LIQA = liquid assets to total assets ratio, CIR = cost to income 
ratio, ∆Y = the real GDP growth rate, INF = inflation, and CR = capital regulation index. Column (1) estimates the 
model with no interaction terms as stated in equation (1). Meanwhile, columns (2)-(4) adds the interaction term, 
i.e. equation (2), where capital regulation is interacted alternatively with bank size, bank capital and bank liquidity. 
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
INFt 0.0027 0.0030 0.0029 0.0027
(0.193) (0.173) (0.175) (0.197)
CRt 0.0012 -0.1906** 0.0119 0.0029
(0.848) (0.017) (0.259) (0.823)
CRt×LnTAt-1 0.0130**
(0.015)
CRt×EQAt-1 -0.0008
(0.277)
CRt×LIQAt-1 -0.0001
(0.865)
Constant 0.4077** 1.3109*** 0.3587* 0.4020*
(0.042) (0.005) (0.062) (0.057)
# Observations 539 539 539 539
# Banks 45 45 45 45
R-Squared 0.1166 0.1296 0.1196 0.1166
Table 5.
Estimation Results – Bank Loan Growth (contd.)
Figure 3. Marginal Effects of Capital Regulations on Lending Growth
This figure plots the marginal effects of capital regulation on loan growth across bank-specific characteristics as suggested by 
Brambor et al. (2006). In the figure, the 90% confidence interval is provided together with the frequency distribution (histogram) of 
bank-specific characteristics in the background.
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(a) Bank Size
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Figure 3. Marginal Effects of Capital Regulations on Lending Growth (contd.)
This figure plots the marginal effects of capital regulation on loan growth across bank-specific characteristics as suggested by 
Brambor et al. (2006). In the figure, the 90% confidence interval is provided together with the frequency distribution (histogram) of 
bank-specific characteristics in the background.
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Again, bank size emerges as a significant factor shaping the relation between 
capital regulation and loan growth. Only in column (2), where we interact capital 
regulation with size, do we find both capital regulation and the interaction term to 
be significant. These results suggest that, for small Islamic banks, capital regulation 
stringency curtails loan growth. This negative effect of capital regulation on loan 
growth, however, is reversed when Islamic banks become larger. The marginal 
effects plotted in Figure 3, panel (a), reaffirm this interpretation. As for capital 
and liquidity, we do not find evidence suggesting that they condition the capital 
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regulation – loan growth relation (see Figure 3). This finding is in line with the 
evidence provided in Deli and Hasan (2017) for a worldwide sample of banks. 
Although these authors note the significant role of bank capital in shaping the 
relation between capital requirements and credit growth, there is no permanent 
effect of capital regulation on loan growth.
As for the other control variables, we find a reduction in loan growth as 
bank size increases. Viewed together with the positive coefficient of the capital 
regulation – size interaction, i.e., column (2), the increase in loan growth by large 
banks materializes under stringent capital regulation requirements. This reaffirms 
our conclusion as to capital regulation and bank stability that, as Islamic banks 
become larger, more capital regulation is needed. We also find evidence that more 
liquid and more profitable banks tend to lend more. Finally, in line with many 
studies, we find lending growth of Islamic banks to move in tandem with business 
cycles (Ibrahim, 2016).
V. CONCLUSION
The Islamic banking sector has expanded rapidly over the years in many countries, 
especially in Malaysia and the Middle East. Being financial intermediaries, Islamic 
banks normally face the same regulatory environments as those initially designed 
for conventional banks, such as the Basel capital requirements and regulations. 
Given institutional differences between Islamic and conventional banks, the results 
obtained for conventional banks may not be applicable to Islamic banks. Thus, we 
assess the relation between capital regulation and Islamic bank risk, profitability, 
and loan growth and evaluate whether their relation varies with bank size, capital, 
and liquidity. Our results indicate heterogeneities in their relations, which are 
mainly conditioned by bank size.
More specifically, small banks are less stable, less profitable, and cut loan 
growth in the face of more stringent capital regulations. These negative effects, 
however, are subdued or even reversed when banks become larger. We also 
uncover evidence that the benefits of having large Islamic banks, in the form of 
improved stability and higher loan growth, manifest only when stringent capital 
regulation is in place. Apart from these findings, we also document evidence that 
the profitability of Islamic banks with low liquidity is adversely affected by capital 
regulation. Interestingly, the profitability of highly capitalized Islamic banks is 
also negatively affected by capital regulation. This may reflect the costly nature of 
both capital and capital regulation.
The policy implications of our results are clear. Capital regulation is important 
for Islamic banks, especially in countries where Islamic banks have grown in 
size and complexity. However, given the observed heterogeneities in the relation 
between capital regulation and bank performance, capital regulation should not 
be adopted blindly as a one-size-fits-all rule, especially in countries where Islamic 
banks are small or at the beginning stage of development.
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